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I. Introduction 
The relationship between the nature of the employment contract and worker productivity has 
long intrigued economists. Particular, but somewhat disjoint, emphasis has recently focused 
upon the implications of fixed wage, performance related pay (PRP), and self-employment 
(sic) contracts. The efficiency wage hypothesis, for example, has examined the notion that 
the firm’s production costs might be inversely related to the level of pay and, in so doing, has 
proffered an explanation for equilibrium unemployment.1 The analysis of self-employment 
has focused on its potential as a means of alleviating unemployment [Taylor (1996), 
Bernhardt (1994), de Wit (1993), Fujii and Hawley (1991), Rees and Shah (1986)]. Perhaps 
most controversial of all has been the academic and popular interest in PRP. Re-kindled by 
Weitzman’s (1985, 1987) purported macroeconomic benefits of profit sharing, attention has 
turned towards the more readily discernible, and originally lauded, microeconomic benefits 
of PRP schemes broadly defined [see Weitzman and Kruse (1990), Blinder (1990)]. 
We contribute to an improved understanding of these issues by focusing on the shape 
of the experience-earnings profile for workers employed under each type of contract. We 
follow Lazear (1979) in hypothesising that the slope of this profile reflects agency costs, and 
the reduction thereof, with increased agency costs inducing steeper profiles. The divergence 
of interests and asymmetry of information between principal and agent may cause output to 
depend upon the contingent nature of the compensation contract. If the costs of monitoring 
worker performance are excessive, firms may introduce compensation schemes, which 
encourage workers to self-select behaviour in the firms’ interests. One method of doing this is 
to defer a substantial component of compensation until the later years of tenure. Such a wage 
profile would provide a penalty for shirking and thereby encourage workers to work 
efficiently over their employment-cycle. Intuitively, by paying younger workers less than 
their marginal product, and older workers conversely more, the firm is able to keep the 
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present value of wages equal to the present value of productivity. This provides incentives to 
workers that would be absent if they were to be paid a wage that more closely followed 
productivity over their employment-cycle.  
We therefore presume that the profiles of workers employed under fixed wage 
‘salaried’ contracts are steeper than those of self-employed workers for whom the issue of 
agency does not arise. The interesting case is that of workers employed under a PRP contract. 
If, as we propose, such contracts represent a hybrid between salaried and self-employment, 
then one would expect their experience-earnings profiles to lie somewhere between the two 
extreme cases. If such a hypothesis is correct then it casts new light on the nature of the 
experience-earnings profile, suggesting that the profile reflects agency costs, and the 
reduction thereof. Moreover, it may help to illuminate a hitherto neglected conduit for the 
transmission of productivity benefits under collective PRP schemes such as profit sharing: 
ceteris paribus, the same experience-earnings profile would inspire relatively less shirking 
under a profit-sharing as compared to a salaried contract on account of the lower degree of 
agency considerations that must be overcome. Alternatively, the same degree of effort may 
be obtained from risk averse workers via a flatter, and therefore less expensive, earnings 
profile. 
The nature of the profile has important implications for labour market behaviour. If 
the slope is primarily a reflection of human capital considerations, then it offers some clue as 
to the return to on-the-job training and educational investments. If agency considerations are 
paramount then it raises issues concerning the credibility of long-term employment contracts 
- firms may have an incentive to fire ‘older’ expensive, but no more productive, workers. A 
time-consistency problem may arise, with particular firms unable to recruit younger, less 
experienced applicants because of their inability to commit not to dismiss them in the future. 
If the profile, however reflects training, such an incentive-compatibility problem will not 
arise - older workers will be more productive ceteris paribus. The nature of the earnings 
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profile may also impinge upon quitting behaviour. More experienced ‘generally’ trained 
workers will have more manoeuvrability in the labour market than their otherwise similar 
‘firm-specifically’ trained counterparts. But both types may have more options than those 
older workers whose market rents are primarily a reflection of agency considerations. 
The paper is set out as follows: Section II reviews previous work into the nature of the 
experience-earnings profile. Our empirical investigations are set out in Sections III and IV 
whilst final comments are collected in Section V. 
II. Background 
The positive correlation between experience and earnings is one of the most robust and 
uncontentious findings in labour economics.2 The source of the relationship, however, is 
somewhat opaque and in recent years two key theoretical explanations have emerged.3 First, 
the general human capital model posits that workers become more productive, and hence 
better remunerated, on account of investments in human capital or training. Training 
investments can be either of a general, readily transferable variety or of a specific, non-
transferable variety, both of which increase a worker’s productivity over time in the current 
firm. The human capital thesis suggests that it is the return to this investment, with initial 
relatively low and subsequent relatively high real wages, which causes the earnings profile to 
have an upward slope [Becker (1975), Ben-Porath (1967), Mincer (1958, 1974)]. Wage 
growth is therefore equivalent to the return to investment in on-the-job training plus the 
change (i.e. reduction) in the investment from period to period minus any depreciation of the 
stock of human capital. Larger amounts of on-the-job training will result in steeper wage 
profiles.4 
The second explanation is grounded in the theory of agency. It has long been 
observed that worker productivity is inexorably linked to the form of the compensation 
scheme [see Mitchell et al (1990)]. From the early work of Johnson (1950), Cheung (1969) 
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and Ross (1973), a recurring theme of this literature is that the divergence of interests and 
asymmetry of information between principal and agent cause output to depend upon the 
contingent nature of the compensation contract. The prohibitive cost of monitoring worker 
performance necessitates compensation schemes, which encourage workers to self-select 
behaviour the firm considers to be optimal. One method of doing this is to defer a substantial 
component of compensation until the later years of tenure. Such a wage profile provides a 
penalty for shirking and thereby encourages workers to work efficiently over their 
employment-cycle. Intuitively, by paying younger workers less than their marginal product, 
and older workers conversely more, the firm is able to keep the present value of wages equal 
to the present value of productivity. This provides incentives to workers that would be absent 
if they were to be paid a wage that more closely followed productivity over their 
employment-cycle. Essentially, steep profiles provide ex post rents that the worker is 
reluctant to lose. If reducing effort increases the probability of involuntary termination, then 
steep profiles increase the cost of shirking, thereby encouraging workers to raise their effort 
level, and in this sense represent a form of efficiency wage payment [Lazear (1979, 1981)]. 
Much of the existing research testing the competing hypotheses considers whether or 
not wage increases are closely positively correlated with productivity increases [see, for 
example, Medoff and Abraham (1981), Brown (1989), Kotlikoff and Gokhale (1992), 
Hellerstein and Neumark (1995)].5 Some of the studies that have tested this relationship 
empirically, however, have found wage profiles to be steeper than measures of productivity 
growth.6 Medoff and Abraham (1980) found that, within job categories wages tended to rise 
over time whilst supervisor performance evaluations (a proxy for productivity) were 
relatively flat.7 Taking a somewhat different approach, Frank and Hutchens (1988) showed 
that, even in professions such as airline pilots and inter-city bus drivers where productivity 
would seem to be relatively static, workers receive wages that rise substantially with tenure. 
Similar findings were obtained in an earlier study of ‘accelerating obsolescence of older 
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engineers’ [Dalton and Thompson (1971)]. Also consistent with the notion that wages rise 
faster than productivity is the finding of a so-called ‘tenure effect’ [Mincer and Jovanovic 
(1981)] - the observation that wages within a firm rise relative to alternatives as job seniority 
rises.8 
There are several reasons why wage growth might outstrip productivity growth. 
Deferred compensation may deter shirking by raising the monetary consequences to a worker 
of being fired [Lazear (1981)]. Alternatively, deferred wages may serve as a self-selection 
device to discourage workers with high quit propensities from joining the firm [Salop and 
Salop (1976)]. Other explanations rely on the assumption that workers are more risk averse 
than the firm they work for [Harris and Holmstrom (1982)] or that firms can earn a higher 
rate of return on assets than workers. In the latter view, firms invest a fraction of workers’ 
wages early in their careers and dole out the returns in the form of deferred wages. 
An insightful method of discriminating between the human capital and agency 
explanation has been posited by Lazear and Moore (1984) who focus on empirical evidence 
regarding the relative ‘flatness’ of self-employed workers age-earnings profiles [Wolpin 
(1974), Fuchs (1981)]. Such a finding would seem to be problematic given that investment in 
physical capital depresses observed wages for the young self-employed, whilst the later 
returns to that investment raise observed wages. Both factors would tend to steepen 
experience earnings profiles for the self employed vis a vis wage and salary workers.  
Lazear and Moore (1984) rationalise this finding by highlighting the defining nature 
of self-employment, namely the duality of principal and ownership. Such an arrangement 
eliminates any disharmony of interests and so removes the necessity of engendering efficient 
effort over the life cycle through the use of a positively sloped wage profile. Observed 
profiles, argue Lazear and Moore (1984), are a reflection of the disharmony of interests 
prevalent in the employment relation that are, by definition, absent from self-employment. By 
increasing the slope of the profile employers are able to induce their employees to work 
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harder, therefore raising the present value of the latter’s lifetime earnings. The self-employed 
require no such internal incentive mechanism and thus, may be used as a control to test the 
theoretical prediction that the shape of the experience-earnings profile is determined 
primarily by agency as opposed to human capital considerations. 
In what follows we generalise Lazear and Moore’s analysis by focusing not only on 
salaried and self-employed workers, but also on workers who receive some element of PRP. 
Our presumption is that the employment contracts of all three worker types can be nested in 
the form: 
( ) ( )θλλ ;efww jjj +−= 1  (1) 
where j = s, prp,se  denotes ‘salaried’, ‘PRP’ and ‘self-employment’ employment 
respectively. wj  denotes total remuneration, w  the component of total remuneration that is 
‘fixed’ (i.e. independent of worker performance), and ( )θ;ef  some function mapping the 
relationship between worker performance (i.e. effort), e, ‘uncertainty’, θ  and pay.9 jλ  
represents the degree of equity held by a worker in his/her enterprise, viz. the proportion of 
total remuneration that is dependent upon performance.10 We presume that 0=sλ , 
λ prp ∈ 0,1( ), 1=seλ  such that: 
wws =  (2) 
( ) ( )θλλ ;efww prpprpprp +−= 1   (3) 
( )θ;efwse =  (4) 
Our presumption is that the shape of the experience-earnings profile depends critically upon 
λ j . To be sure, we presume that agency costs decline monotonically with λ j  such that the 
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slope of the PRP earnings profile falls between the zero-equity, fixed wage and one hundred 
per cent equity, self-employed profiles.11 Hence, in this paper we essentially generalise the 
approach pioneered by Lazear and Moore (1984) in order to allow for the intermediate 
category of PRP, which enables us to further explore the agency explanation behind the 
positive slope of the experience-earnings profile. 
IV. Data and Methodology 
Data 
Our empirical analysis draws on three British data sets vis. the British Social Attitudes 
Surveys 1985, 1987, 1993 and 1996, the British Household Panel Surveys 1991-1999 and the 
British Family Expenditure Surveys 1997/98, 1998/99 and 1999/00. 
The British Social Attitudes Surveys (BSAS) are an annual series of surveys initiated 
in 1983 by Social and Community Planning Research. The data are derived from a cross-
sectional sample of individuals, aged 18 and over, living in private households whose 
addresses were on the electoral registrar. From the 650 Parliamentary constituencies in Great 
Britain, 114 were chosen on the basis of the Registrar General’s Standard Regions to 
facilitate the sampling. From each of the constituencies a polling district was randomly 
selected and addresses were randomly chosen from these districts.  
The surveys conducted in 1985, 1987, 1993 and 1996 contained questions relating to 
the presence of PRP vis. whether in the year of interview the respondent had received some 
component of their total remuneration in the form of: (i) a productivity linked bonus scheme; 
(ii) an annual bonus (at the employing organisation’s discretion); (iii) a share ownership or 
share option scheme; or (iv) a profit sharing scheme. Individuals who reported that they had 
participated in any of the four schemes were labelled as PRP employees.12 Selecting out all 
male respondents in salaried-, PRP-, or self-employment with complete records rendered 
1467, 783, and 491 individuals respectively.13 
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Our second data set is based on the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), 1991 -
1999. This is a random sample survey carried out by the Institute for Social and Economic 
Research of each adult member of a nationally representative sample of more than 5,000 
private households (yielding approximately 10,000 individual interviews). For Wave one, 
interviews were conducted during the autumn of 1991. The same individuals are re-
interviewed in successive waves – the latest being wave twelve. The main objective of the 
BHPS is to further understanding of social and economic change at the individual and 
household level in Britain.  
We explore data from the 1991-1999 surveys. In the first wave (1991), all individuals 
are asked whether their pay includes bonuses or profit sharing thereby enabling us to identify 
PRP employees. For the period, 1992-1995, this question is only asked to individuals who 
change their job. We therefore assume that individuals who do not change job remain in their 
1991 employment type. We specify an unbalanced panel of data whereby the minimum 
number of times an individual is in the sample is one and the maximum is nine. Our sample 
comprises 4,594 fixed wage employees, 2,806 PRP employees and 1153 self-employees. 
Our third data set is drawn from the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) for Great 
Britain, which is a nationally representative survey that has been conducted on an annual 
basis since 1957. Some 10,000 households are selected each year to take part in the FES, and 
the average response rate is approximately 70%. The main aim of the survey is to provide a 
reliable source of information on household expenditure, income and other aspects of 
household finances. To account for seasonal differences in expenditure, face-to-face 
interviews are spread evenly over the year. Each individual aged 16 or over in the households 
visited is asked to keep diary records of daily expenditure for two weeks. Respondents are 
also asked to complete an income questionnaire.  
We use data from the 1997-1998, 1998-1999, and 1999-2000 surveys.14 Our sub-
sample comprises working males aged between 18 and 65 who are either self-employed or 
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employed under a fixed wage contract or a contract characterised by PRP. Those individuals 
classified as being employed under a PRP contract were those in receipt of a productivity 
linked bonus, profit-related pay, dividends from employee share ownership, an incentive 
bonus or a performance related bonus. Our sample consists of 8405 male respondents 
comprising 5965 fixed wage employees, 1201 PRP employees and 1239 self-employees. 
It is apparent that there is some tension between our theoretical and empirical 
definitions of PRP. The former defines PRP as any contract in which current pay is related to 
current performance broadly defined. Some jobs reward performance with a promotion 
and/or a salary increment rather than with an explicit bonus. Moreover, some bonus schemes 
may also be used to identify ‘fast-track’ employees, and as such a revelatory component may 
be in operation as the employer learns more about a worker’s skills and ability in the early 
years following an initial hire.15 The BHPS, but not the BSAS or FES, asks specific questions 
relating to promotions and salary increments in each year, and we therefore augment our 
BHPS empirical analysis by including dummy variables to control for these factors.16 
The empirical definitions of PRP in the three data sets are quite explicit. The BSAS 
and FES adopt a similarly broad definition that includes productivity-linked and discretionary 
bonuses, share ownership /options, and profit sharing. The BHPS focuses on just bonuses 
(type not defined) and profit sharing.17 Which definition is more appropriate is largely a 
matter of interpretation, but our results are broadly consistent across the three data sets, and 
were not found to be significantly affected by the exclusion of share option / ownership from 
the BSAS and FES definitions.  
Full sample statistics for each of the data sets are set out in Tables 1 to 3 (all tables 
are presented in the Appendix).18 A common finding in all three data sets is the relatively low 
earnings of self-employed respondents. The problems of accurately measuring self-
employment pay are well documented [see Eardley and Corden (1996)]. What is important in 
our analysis, however, is the consistency in reported self-employment earnings. Since we are 
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interested primarily in the slope of the experience-earnings profile, measurement error is not 
too problematic if self-employment income is consistently under-reported by respondents.  
Methodology 
Our analysis is based on a Mincerian earnings equation of the form: 
2ln
ijtijt ijt j j ijt j ijt
w E Eα β ε= Χ Β + + +  (5) 
where ijtw  represents the hourly earnings of an individual i employed in employment type j at 
time t, with j = s, prp, se representing the three employment categories.19 ijtΧ  represents a 
vector of personal and workplace characteristics including education, occupational status and 
industrial affiliation, whilst ijtE  denotes labour force experience at time t, proxied by the 
respondent’s age at time t less his/her age when they completed full-time education.20  
It is apparent that a first-best estimation of (5) would utilise a panel data source. We 
adopt such an approach with the BHPS sample which follows the same individuals across 
1991 to 1999. In the case of the BSAS and FES analysis we are obliged to utilise pooled cross 
sectional data. This is not too problematic - if we assume that the vector of personal / 
workplace characteristics is stable across time then Χijt = Χij , ∀t , and the shape of the 
earnings profile may be calculated as: 
ln
2
ln
ijt
j j ijt
ijt
w
E
E
α β∂ = +∂  (6) 
There remain, however, two key problems with estimating earnings profiles from cross 
sectional data. First, the job matching hypothesis suggests that tenure will be relatively long, 
and earnings relatively high, where a good match has been struck between employer and 
employee [Jovanovic (1979)]. The quality of any match will only become known over time 
and where job match quality is high it will be in the interests of both parties to maintain the 
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employment contract. This may oblige the firm to pay a wage that minimises employee 
turnover such that high quality job matches exhibit both relatively high wages and relatively 
long tenures. Cross-sectional data, allowing only one point of observation in each match 
length, contains no information about the quality of a job match and may bias any estimates 
of returns to tenure.  
In addition, estimation is further complicated on account of potential sample selection 
bias. Our earnings data derive from observing a particular employment contract (i.e. salaried, 
PRP, self-employment) and there may be variables that affect both the probability of 
observing such a contract and the return to any factors in the earnings equation. To take 
account of such considerations, we control for sample selection bias. Probit analysis with 
three discrete outcomes is used to model the determination of Z, ( )jZprob i = , i.e. the 
probability of being in one of the three possible types of employment, which is then used to 
calculate the standard inverse mills ratio term, ijtδ : 
( )
( ) ( )ijtijtijt
ijtijt
HH
PH
Φ=
Φ= −
/
1
φδ
 (7) 
where ijtP  denotes the predicted probability of individual i at time t being employed under 
contract type j, ( ).φ  represents the probability density function of the standard normal 
distribution, and ( ).Φ  represents the cumulative density function of the standard normal 
distribution. By incorporating ijtδ  into the wage regression, we are controlling for the fact 
that particular types of individuals are likely to be employed under specific types of 
employment contract. 
To explore the robustness of our findings we experimented with three alternative 
measures of labour market experience. Firstly, for all three of our data sets, we estimated age-
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earnings profiles. Secondly, for the BSAS sample only (such information is not available in 
the BHPS or FES data sets) we estimated employer tenure-earnings profiles for fixed wage 
and PRP employees, making use of the question asked in 1993 and 1996: ‘How long have 
you been continuously employed by your present employer?’ And finally, for the BHPS 
sample only, we estimated job tenure-earnings profiles, making use of following question: 
‘What was the date you started working in your present position? If you have been promoted 
or changed grades, please give me the date of that change. Otherwise please give me the date 
when you started doing the job you are doing now for your present employer.’  This question 
is asked to all employed respondents, whilst all self-employed respondents were asked ‘On 
what date did you start doing your present job, by that I mean the beginning of your current 
spell of doing the work you are doing now on a self-employed basis?’ Thus, the responses to 
both questions are used to calculate current job tenure for employees and self-employees. 
IV. Results 
We estimate a standard quadratic Mincerian wage equation as depicted by equations (5) and 
(7). In the case of the cross-section data, we employ standard OLS techniques whilst in the 
case of the panel data derived from the BHPS we have employed a random effects 
estimator.21 We have experimented with a number of combinations of explanatory variables 
as well as changes to our set of over-identifying instruments in the selectivity equation and 
we have found the regressions to be generally well specified and highly robust. 22 In general, 
our findings accord with the previous literature. For example, our results suggest a generally 
positive relationship between earnings and education as well as a concave relationship 
between earnings and experience. For brevity, we present in Tables 4 to 8 only one 
specification, which includes both educational certificates and years of education.23 Table 4 
presents the results relating to the pooled cross-section analysis of the BSAS whilst Table 5 
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presents the 1991-1999 panel data analysis of the BHPS. Finally, Table 6 presents the pooled 
cross-section analysis of the FES. 
It is apparent from our three samples that the least robust regressions are those for 
self-employed respondents. This is not surprising. Such workers will not be motivated by 
Mincerian type arguments to the same extent as their employed counterparts and, under an 
(extreme) argument whereby the earnings profile is a reflection of agency issues only, would 
not face the necessity of rewarding themselves with an upward sloping profile to ensure 
efficient effort over their life cycle.  
The selectivity terms suggest that sample selection bias is negative in the BSAS 
salaried and PRP regressions, positive in the BSAS self-employment regression, positive in 
the FES salaried regression, negative in the FES PRP and self-employment regressions, 
negative in the BHPS fixed wage sample, and positive in the BHPS PRP sample. Ignoring 
selectively issues would have therefore led to significant bias in the estimated coefficients. 
It is apparent from Tables 4-6 that the estimated coefficients on the various labour 
force experience proxies (i.e. Age, Years in Labour Force, Job-Tenure and Employer-Tenure) 
support our theoretical prior that the slope of the earnings profile for PRP workers lies 
between those of their salaried and self-employed counterparts. In terms of the BSAS and FES 
data (Tables 4 and 6), the three profiles are significantly different from one other at the one-
per cent level of significance irrespective of the experience proxy used. In terms of the BHPS 
data (Table 5), the three profiles are significantly different from one another at the one per 
cent level of significance when experience is proxied by age or job tenure, whilst the profiles 
associated with PRP and self-employment and fixed wage and self employment (but not 
fixed wage and PRP) are significantly different from each other at the one per cent level 
when experience is proxied by years in the labour force. 
Our BHPS results also highlight the positive relationship between the dummy variable 
recording whether the respondent had been promoted in the current year (Promotion) and the 
14 
earnings of fixed wage and PRP workers, and between the existence of incremental pay 
scales at the respondent’s place of work (Annual Increment) and the earnings of PRP 
workers. We experimented with interacting Annual Increment and Promotion with the 
various experience proxies. These results confirm the validity of our findings regarding the 
experience-earnings profiles.24 Moreover, in the case of the Promotion variable, they also 
cast additional light on the roles played by human capital and agency. Interacting the various 
experience proxies with Promotion suggested that the ordering of the three profiles was not 
affected by whether respondents had enjoyed a promotion in the current year. Indeed, we 
found that the difference in the three slopes (i.e. the agency effect) was actually more 
pronounced for those periods that fell in between promotions. Such findings support the 
argument that human capital may be more relevant to obtaining promotions whilst agency 
effects appear to operate primarily between promotions.25 
Lambda as a Continuous Variable 
The FES and the BHPS (1997-1999) record the total amount of remuneration received in the 
form of the bonus. We are therefore able to proxy the size of the sharing coefficient, lambda. 
To be sure, our theoretical priors specified expected remuneration under the general form of 
the employment contract as: 
( ) ( )1 ;w w f eλ λ θ= − +  (8) 
Thus total remuneration is split into a fixed and variable component, the division depending 
on the size of the sharing coefficientλ . We can proxy λ  by calculating the ratio of bonus to 
total pay vis: 
( )
( ) ( )
;
1 ;
f eBonus Pay
Total Pay w f e
λ θλ λ λ θ= = − +
  (9) 
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with: 
0
lim 0λ λ→ =  (10) 
1
lim 1λ λ→ =  (11) 
Sample statistics for both the FES and BHPS samples relating to λ  are set out in Table 7. 
Our prior is that a higher value of λ  raises the expected cost of early-term shirking on 
the part of the worker and thereby leads to a flattening of his/her experience-earnings profile. 
To investigate this empirically we ran three earnings regressions pooling the self-employed, 
the PRP employees and the fixed wage employees together for each of the two data sets, i.e. 
the FES data and the BHPS data - see Tables 8 and 9 respectively. In the case of the FES, we 
conduct OLS analysis whilst in the case of the BHPS we adopt a random effects approach 
given that we are able to exploit the panel element to the data, i.e. we have information about 
the same individuals at potentially three different points in time. Once again, an unbalanced 
panel approach is adopted whereby the minimum (maximum) number of times an individual 
is in the sample is one (three).  
Specification (1) illustrates that higher values of λ  are associated with significantly 
lower earnings - this effect is probably reflecting the presence of self-employed workers 
within our sample. Specifications (2) and (3) focussed on the interaction between experience 
and the value of λ . Our results suggest that higher levels of sharing are indeed associated 
with a flattening of the experience-earnings profile. In the case of the FES, our findings 
suggest that as the coefficient of sharing moves from zero to unity, the annual rate of return 
(in terms of log hourly earnings) to an additional year of labour market experience falls from 
just under five percent to less than one per cent. 
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To summarise, our findings related to the proxy of λ  provide further support for the 
hypothesis that the slope of the experience-earnings profile is influenced by both the presence 
and extent of PRP. 
Training 
Our results would seem to support the hypothesis that experience-earnings profiles do reflect 
agency considerations, with PRP profiles generally lying somewhere between salaried and 
self-employed profiles. Furthermore, we would argue that our findings are relatively robust 
given that we have used three different data sets (including both cross-section and panel data) 
as well as exploring our theoretical priors via two different approaches and exploring 
alternative measures of experience. In addition, we would argue that the intuition related to 
the agency explanation behind the relative ranking of the slopes of the experience-earnings 
profiles is clear. However, it is also apparent that an alternative argument can be offered. It 
may be the case that PRP workers undertake relatively less training than their salaried 
counterparts, implying relatively high (low) starting (future) earnings, and thus flatter 
profiles. It is difficult to rationalise such an argument - it might seem that workers 
remunerated under PRP are, if anything, more likely to respond to investments in training 
than their salaried counterparts. To investigate this possibility we investigated the relative 
likelihood of salaried and PRP respondents having undertaken some form of training at their 
place of work. Two of our three data sets (BSAS and BHPS) contained information regarding 
whether respondents had received training within their firm.  
The BSAS survey for 1987 asked respondents, in the two years preceding the survey 
interview, whether they had been: (i) asked to do anything just for practice in order to learn 
the work; (ii) given any special talks or lectures about the work; (iii) placed with more 
experienced people to see how the work should be done; (iv) sent around to different parts of 
the organisation to see how the work is done; (v) asked to read things to help learn about the 
17 
work; (vi) taught or trained by anyone whilst actually doing the work; (vii) sent on any 
courses to introduce new methods of working. We created two variables – a dummy variable 
(‘Train’) which takes the value of one if the respondent answered ‘yes’ to any of these 
questions and an index (‘Trains’) which equals the number of these questions to which the 
respondent had answered ‘yes’ to the various types of training. Thus, ‘Train’ represents a 
binary dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual has received any training, 
whilst ‘Trains’ represents an index, which ranges from 0 to 7 indicating the number of types 
of training undertaken. We are therefore able to focus on both the incidence (‘Train’) and 
intensity of training (‘Trains’). 
Participants in the BHPS were asked a somewhat less detailed question than their 
BSAS counterparts, simply whether in the preceding year they had participated in any off-the-
job education or training. Relevant summary statistics for these variables for both data sets 
are set out in Table 10. Given that our focus is on the incidence of training at relatively low 
levels of experience, we present summary statistics for four levels of experience. In the case 
of the BSAS sample, it appears that PRP employees do receive less training than their fixed 
wage counterparts. This finding may be taken as support for the evidence of a training effect. 
The situation is reversed, however, at the lowest category of experience, which arguably is 
the focus of our attention. In the case of the BHPS samples, the support for the training 
explanation is less clear-cut with PRP employees, in general, being characterised by a higher 
incidence of training. 
We explore the incidence and intensity of training across PRP and fixed wage 
employees by conducting probit analysis (dependent variable – Train) and ordered probit 
analysis (dependent variable – Trains). Our findings are set out in Table 11. It is apparent that 
in the case of the BSAS, the PRP dummy variable has no effect on the probability that the 
respondent had so engaged in training. The probability of training was, however, 
significantly negatively related to the respondent’s experience in the labour market, perhaps 
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reflecting the fact that most training is undertaken by relatively younger workers. To 
ascertain whether there was any interaction between such experience and the PRP dummy we 
ran a second specification of the dichotomous and ordered probit models, this time including 
a series of experience-PRP interactions terms vis. ‘Experience less than five years*PRP’; 
‘Experience more than five years but less than ten years*PRP’; ‘Experience more than ten 
years but less than twenty years*PRP’; ‘Experience more than twenty years*PRP’. The 
coefficients on these terms were insignificant in the dichotomous probit but those on the last 
three were significantly negative in the ordered probit. Thus it does appear that more 
experienced workers receive relatively less training than their non-PRP counterparts, ceteris 
paribus. It should be noted, however, that we are primarily interested in the incidence of 
training at the lower level of experience.  
We repeated this analysis for the BHPS sample. In the case of the panel data set, the 
results from employing a random effects probit estimator suggest that PRP employees are 
more likely to receive training, which provides evidence contrary to the training explanation. 
Our results are therefore somewhat mixed and the BSAS findings allude to the 
possibility that differences in the earning-experience profile may not be driven solely by 
agency consideration. But these findings are not reflected in the BHPS data.  
V. Final Comments 
This paper has focused on the relationship between experience-earnings profiles and the 
degree of worker equity within an enterprise. We extend Lazear and Moore’s (1984) thesis 
that the nature of the profile is primarily a reflection of agency considerations by focusing not 
only on those workers with zero or one hundred per cent equity (i.e. salaried and self-
employed workers respectively), but also on those with a fractional level of equity vis. 
workers remunerated under some form of PRP. Our presumption is that these latter face an 
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intermediate level of agency costs and as such require an intermediate profile. Our empirical 
analysis of three British data sets offers some support for this view. 
Our results might be interpreted as support for the argument that the shape of the 
experience-earnings profile is primarily a reflection of the costs of agency rather than of the 
accumulation of human capital through on-the-job training. As such, they highlight important 
issues pertaining to the credibility of long-term employment contracts, since employers may 
be tempted to replace experienced workers with less costly, but equally productive, novices. 
But the latter will not remain ‘young’ forever, and whether they will be inclined to work for a 
firm that is unable to guarantee them employment in their dotage is an open question. 
Moreover, our findings may help to illuminate a hitherto neglected conduit for the 
transmission of productivity benefits under collective PRP schemes such as profit sharing: if 
capital markets are imperfect then the same experience-earnings profile would inspire 
relatively less shirking under a profit-sharing as compared to a salaried contract on account of 
the lower degree of agency considerations that must be overcome. Alternatively, the same 
degree of effort may be obtained from risk averse workers via a flatter, and therefore less 
expensive, earnings profile. 
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Endnotes 
 
1 See Akerlof and Yellen (1986), Weiss (1991) and Carmichael (1990) for extensive reviews of the microeconomic 
foundations under-pinning efficiency wage models. 
2 For an extensive survey of the literature see Polachek and Siebert (1992). 
3 Recent work in this area has emphasised the plausibility of other explanations. For example, search models generally 
predict that more time in the labour marker increases the chance of finding a better match and thus tends to be associated 
with higher earnings [Burdett (1978), Ruhm (1991), Jacobson and LaLonde (1993), Manning (1997)]. Alternatively, 
workers may prefer rising earnings profiles as a form of forced saving [Loewenstein and Sicherman (1991), Frank and 
Hutchens (1993)]. 
4 The introduction of labour-fixed costs or firm specific human capital [Becker (1975)] partially qualifies these predictions. 
Since investment in firm-specific human capital is assumed to be shared by the worker and the firm, the resulting wage 
profile will be flatter than the path of productivity such that wage profiles will be either equivalent to, or flatter than, 
productivity growth over the life cycle [Hashimoto and Yu (1980)].  
5 Implications of specific human capital investment are ambiguous. Becker (1975) argues that such investment implies that 
wages grow slower than marginal products. Blinder (1981) and Carmichael (1983), however, develop specific human capital 
models in which wages grow faster than marginal products. Some implications of the forced saving model are similar to 
those of Lazear’s model, since workers are paid less than their marginal products when young and more when old. 
6 Estimating the actual relationship between wages and productivity growth is problematic since productivity cannot in 
general be measured directly. Hence, most studies rely on indirect measures of productivity, limit the analysis to specific 
jobs, or ignore promotions and turnover. 
7 This approach was later criticised by Weiss and Landau (1985) who argued that the correlation between wages and 
productivity within a job category would be attenuated if productivity were used as a criterion for promotion. 
8 The tenure effect has been the focus of controversy. A number of economists have argued that the observed seniority 
premium is a statistical artefact [see, for example, Abraham and Farber (1987), Altonji and Shakotko (1987), Marshall and 
Zarkin (1987)] whilst others have found the effect to be substantial and significant [see, for example, Topel (1990)]. 
9 Uncertainty may be related, for example, to conditions in the output market. 
10 We assume in what follows that the extent of worker equity, as measured by λ , is exogenous being fixed by custom or 
government directive. This is obviously a simplistic assumption and a fuller exposition would seek to explain the 
distribution of different contractual arrangements. 
11 Equation (3) defines PRP as any contract in which current pay is related to worker performance broadly defined. The 
practical operation of such schemes is certainly more nuanced - see, for example, Blinder (1990), Booth and Frank (1999).  
12 Clearly, the four schemes are diverse in nature and as such create different incentives. Ideally, we would classify 
individuals according to the type of PRP scheme. Such an approach would be somewhat problematic, however, due to the 
low number of observations in each scheme. 
 
22 
 
13 In order to abstract from issues related to labour market participation, throughout our analysis we focus on male 
employees only. 
14 Prior to this period the dataset had a slightly different structure and some of the variables required for our analysis are not 
available. 
15 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for highlighting this point. 
16 The specific questions are: Promotion – What was the date you started working in your present position? If you have been 
promoted or changed grades, please give me the date of that change. Otherwise please give me the date when you started 
doing the job you are doing now for your present employer; Annual Increment – Some people can normally expect their pay 
to rise every year by moving to the next point on the scale, as well as receiving negotiated pay rises. Are you paid on this 
type of incremental scale? Zero-one dummy variables were created from both of these questions – see Table 5, Note 2 for 
details. 
17 There is also some distinction between the BSAS / FES and BHPS definitions of self-employment. In the BSAS and FES, 
individuals are categorised according to the following question: ‘In your main job, are you an employee or a self-
employee?’ In the BHPS, individuals are asked to specify their current labour force status , with options including ‘paid-
employment’, ‘self-employment,’ ‘unemployed’, ‘retired’, ‘on maternity leave’, ‘in family care’, ‘full-time student’, ‘long 
term sick / disabled’, ‘on a government training schemes’, ‘other’. 
18 A small number of individuals with more than one job, individuals employed by the armed forces and agricultural workers 
were excluded from the analysis of each data set. 
19 The definition of hourly earnings differs across our three data sets according to the survey questions asked of respondents. 
For the BHPS, hourly earnings are defined as labour income in the previous month divided by the number of hours normally 
worked per month. For the BSAS, they are defined as the respondent’s gross annual earnings divided by the number of hours 
the respondent works per week multiplied by 52. For the FES, hourly employed earnings are defined as the normal gross 
weekly wage divided by usual weekly hours whilst hourly self-employed earnings are defined as normal gross income from 
self-employment divided by usual weekly hours worked 
20 Following Murphy and Welch (1990), we also experimented with cubic and quartic experience terms – the results are 
available on request. 
21 The fixed effects estimation results are available from the authors by request. 
22 The over-identifying instruments for the underlying sample selection model included region of residence and a variety of 
demographic controls. The sample selection models, which were estimated using unordered probit analysis with three 
discrete outcomes, are generally well specified. For reasons of brevity, the sample selection results are not presented here, 
but are available from the authors on request. The results reported in Tables 4-6 have all been corrected for sample selection 
bias - uncorrected results are also available on request. 
23 As pointed out by an anonymous referee, the shape of the earnings profiles may be influenced by trade union 
membership, unionisation of the work place, and employment in the public sector. Our results are robust to the inclusion of 
such controls. 
24 The results are available on request. 
25 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for highlighting such issues. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics: 
British Social Attitudes Surveys 1985, 1987, 1993, 1996 
 Fixed Wage 
(N = 1467) 
PRP 
(N = 783) 
Self-Employed 
(N = 491) 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
Log Hourly Earnings 1.716 0.619 1.771 0.610 1.613 0.802 
Years in Labour Force 21.722 12.694 22.253 12.325 25.193 12.398
Age  38.644 11.902 38.789 11.643 41.433  12.258
Employer Tenure1 9.227 11.505 10.757 10.713 - -
Years of Education 11.941 2.191 11.540 1.885 11.566 1.968
Degree 0.192 0.394 0.102 0.303 0.112 0.316
Further Education 0.179 0.384 0.171 0.377 0.147 0.354
A Level 0.141 0.348 0.160 0.367 0.175 0.380
GCSE Grades A to C 0.197 0.398 0.223 0.417 0.220 0.415
GCSE Grades below C 0.065 0.247 0.089 0.286 0.104 0.305
Other Qualification 0.013 0.113 0.010 0.101 0.016 0.127
1985 0.173 0.378 0.203 0.403 0.136 0.344
1987 0.265 0.442 0.340 0.474 0.242 0.429
1993 0.247 0.432 0.169 0.375 0.289 0.454
1996 0.314 0.464 0.289 0.453 0.332 0.471
Professional 0.449 0.498 0.383 0.486 0.236 0.425
Other Non Manual 0.082 0.274 0.093 0.291 0.747 0.435
Skilled Manual 0.270 0.444 0.298 0.457 0.006 0.008 
Semi-Skilled Manual 0.106 0.308 0.138 0.345 0.006 0.078
Unskilled Manual 0.030 0.171 0.027 0.162 0.000 0.000
Energy 0.245 0.155 0.066 0.249 0.004 0.064
Metal Extraction 0.018 0.132 0.065 0.247 0.006 0.078
Metal Goods 0.149 0.356 0.166 0.372 0.037 0.188
Other Manufacturing 0.112 0.316 0.133 0.340 0.041 0.198
Construction 0.074 0.261 0.079 0.270 0.338 0.474
Transport & Communications 0.082 0.274 0.120 0.325 0.079 0.271
Banking 0.065 0.246 0.119 0.324 0.088 0.283
Other Services 0.371 0.483 0.128 0.334 0.242 0.429
Notes: 1. Figures relate to 1993 and 1996 only, since this information was only provided in these years. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
British Household Panel Survey 1991-1999 
 Fixed Wage 
(N = 14284) 
PRP 
(N = 6212) 
Self-Employed 
(N = 3716) 
Variable  Mean  Std. D Mean Std. D Mean Std. D 
Log Hourly Earnings 1.926 0.517 2.029 0.515 1.855  0.842
Years in Labour Force 24.820 12.435 23.588 11.754 29.939  11.872
Years of Education 13.224 4.018 13.214 3.485 12.925 3.933
Job Tenure 4.944 6.451 4.468 6.106 8.409 8.544
Age 38.088 11.568 36.830 11.005 42.903  11.078
Annual Increment 0.294 0.455 0.418 0.493 - -
Promotion 0.053 0.224 0.113 0.316 - -
Degree 0.177 0.381 0.159 0.366 0.120 0.325
Further Education 0.241 0.428 0.278 0.448 0.249 0.432
A level 0.144 0.351 0.160 0.366 0.126 0.332
GCSE Grades A to C 0.195 0.396 0.206 0.404 0.222 0.416
GCSE Grades below C 0.195 0.396 0.054 0.225 0.044  0.205
Other Qualification 0.035 0.185 0.032 0.176 0.047  0.212
Managerial  0.145 0 .352 0.239 0.426 0.194 0.400
Professional 0.115 0.319 0.087 0.282 0.115 0.319
Intermediate Non Manual 0.105 0.307 0.098 0.298 0.109 0.311
Sales  0.035 0.184 0.067 0.251 0.038 0.190
Clerical 0.099 0.299 0.101 0.301 0.005 0.073
Personal Services 0.088 0.283 0.026 0.158 0.013 0.113
Skilled Manual 0.192 0.394 0.173 0.379 0.383 0.486
Semi-Skilled Manual 0.162 0.368 0.153 0.360 0.099 0.300
Unskilled Manual 0.060 0.237 0.056 0.230 0.044  0.204
Energy 0.029 0.168 0.036 0.186 0.003 0.057
Extraction 0.042 0.200 0.070 0.255 0.008 0.088
Engineering 0.144 0.351 0.164 0.370 0.044 0.205
Manufacturing 0.123 0.329 0.116 0.321 0.050 0.217
Construction 0.057 0 .232 0.050 0.217 0.312 0.463
Distribution 0.133 0.340 0.189 0.391 0.198 0.398
Transp, Strge & Communication 0.085 0.279 0.102 0.302 0.079 0.270
Finance 0.104 0.306 0.183 0.387 0.155 0.362
Other Non Manufacturing 0.266 0.442 0.075 0.263 0.139 0.346
1991 0.099 0.298 0.137 0.344 0.113  0.317
1992 0.131 0.337 0.035 0.184 0.107  0.309
1993 0.123 0.328 0.035 0.183 0.102  0.303
1994 0.123 0.329 0.037 0.188 0.104  0.305
1995 0.088 0.284 0.118 0.322 0.105  0.307
1996 0.087 0.281 0.134 0.341 0.107  0.310
1997 0.107 0.309 0.149 0.356 0.115  0.319
1998 0.102 0.303 0.153 0.360 0.109  0.312
1999 0.141 0.348 0.203 0.402 0.137  0.344
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Table 3: Summary Statistics 
Family Expenditure Surveys 1997/98, 1998/99 and 1999/00 
 Fixed Wage 
(N = 5965) 
PRP 
(N = 1201) 
Self-Employed 
(N = 1239) 
Variable  Mean  Std. D Mean Std. D Mean Std. D 
Log Hourly Earnings 2.120 0.564 2.492 0.574 1.601 1.085
Years in Labour Force 22.283 12.413 21.7669 11.247 27.195 11.104
Age 39.644 11.618 39.493 10.376 44.320 10.535 
Years of Education 12.361 2.777 12.726 2.735 12.125 2.810
Degree 0.224 0.417 0.277 0.448 0.194 0.395
Further Education/A Level 0.192 0.394 0.216 0.412 0.157 0.364
GCSE 0.365 0.482 0.357 0.479 0.362 0.481
Less than GCSE 0.218 0.413 0.149 0.356 0.287 0.453
1997/98 0.311 0.463 0.373 0.484 0.378 0.485
1998/99 0.337 0.473 0.320 0.467 0.316 0.465
1999/00 0.353 0.478 0.307 0.462 0.307 0.461
Professional 0.088 0.284 0.122 0.327 0.120 0.325
Managerial 0.321 0.467 0.470 0.499 0.246 0.431
Skilled Manual 0.418 0.493 0.301 0.459 0.517 0.500
Semi-Skilled Manual 0.136 0.343 0.088 0.284 0.078 0.269
Unskilled Manual 0.037 0.190 0.019 0.137 0.039 0.193
Mining and Quarrying 0.016 0.125 0.025 0.156 0.005 0.069
Manufacturing 0.277 0.448 0.357 0.479 0.101 0.301
Electric, Gas and Water Supply 0.011 0.103 0.030 0.171 - -
Construction 0.096 0.294 0.065 0.247 0.322 0.467
Wholesale and Retail Trade 0.103 0.305 0.124 0.330 0.151 0.358
Hotels and Restaurants 0.027 0.162 0.007 0.081 0.020 0.141
Transport, Storage and Coms. 0.085 0.278 0.092 0.290 0.098 0.298
Financial Intermediation 0.021 0.144 0.122 0.327 0.013 0.113
Real Estate 0.096 0.294 0.128 0.334 0.172 0.377
Public Administration 0.092 0.288 0.015 0.122 0.001 0.028
Education 0.074 0.262 0.009 0.095 0.025 0.156
Health 0.056 0.229 0.003 0.058 0.027 0.161
Com., Soc., and Persn. Services 0.047 0.213 0. 022 0.148 0.065 0.247
 
 
 
 
Table 4: British Social Attitudes Survey 1985, 1987, 1993, 1996 
Dependent Variable: Log Hourly Earnings 
 Fixed Wage PRP Self Employed 
 Spec. A Spec. B Spec. C Spec. A Spec. B Spec. C Spec. A Spec. B 
 Coeff T Stat Coeff T Stat Coeff T Stat Coeff T Stat Coeff T Stat Coeff T Stat Coeff T Stat Coeff T Stat 
Age 0.0675 9.92 - - - - 0.0551 5.97 - - - - 0.0171 0.80 - - 
Age-Squared -0.0007 -8.47 - - - - -0.0006 -4.86 - - - - -0.0001 -0.51 - - 
YILF1 - - 0.0483 13.38 - - - - 0.0360 7.36 - - - - 0.0175 1.73 
YILF-Squared - - -0.0008 -10.57 - - - - -0.0005 -5.25 - - - - -0.0002 -1.08 
Employer Tenure - - -  0.0234 8.32 - - - - 0.0159 3.73 - - - - 
Employer Tenure2 - - - - -0.0003 -4.85 - - - - -0.0002 -3.67 - - - - 
Years of Education 0.0317 3.47 0.0439 4.64 0.0104 0.90 0.0301 2.54 0.0421 3.38 0.0315 1.66 0.0647 1.52 0.0241 0.73 
Selectivity Term 0.0088 0.13 -0.2068 -2.97 0.0740 0.93 -0.4043 -3.97 -0.3600 -4.50 -0.2590 -2.48 0.8313 10.90 0.2151 2.12 
Constant -1.2737 -6.40 -0.3485 -2.08 1.0783 5.64 -0.2468 -0.74 0.3199 1.28 1.5331 3.93 0.4793 0.54 0.7479 1.07 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Highest Ed. Cert Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Turning Point (Years) 48.2 30.2 39.0 45.9 36.0 39.8 85.5 74.0 
R2 0.5797 0.5675 0.4541 0.6499 0.6511 0.4337 0.6882 0.3034 
F Statistic 87.80 (24, 1442) 87.50 (24, 1442) 30.76 (22, 801) 64.80 (24, 758) 71.66 (24, 758) 17.22 (22, 335) 120.16 (24, 466) 16.99 (24, 466) 
Nos of Obs. 1467 1467 1467 783 783 783 491 491 
Notes:  
1. YILF = Years in Labour Force 
2. Highest Education Certificates: Degree, Further Education, A Level, GCSE Grades A-C, GCSE Grades below C, Other Qualification;  
3. Occupation Dummies: Professional, Other Non Manual, Skilled Manual, Semi-skilled, Unskilled Manual; Industry Dummies: Energy, Metal Extraction, Metal Goods, Other Manufacturing, 
Construction, Distribution, Transport and Communications, Banking, Other Services. 
4. Robust standard errors are reported. 
5. Tests of equality of the estimated coefficients of age and age squared across the PRP and fixed wage wage equations led to a test statistic of 7.23 and tests of equality of the estimated coefficients of the 
age and age squared terms across the self-employed wage equation and that for PRP employees led to a test statistic of 8.67 suggesting that the age terms are significantly different at the 1% level across 
the three types of worker. 
6. Tests of equality of the estimated coefficients of YILF and YILF-Squared squared across the PRP and fixed wage equations led to a test statistic of 7.10 and tests of equality of the estimated coefficients 
of the experience and experience squared terms across the self-employed wage equation and that for PRP employees led to a test statistic of 8.46 suggesting that the experience terms are significantly 
different at the 1% level across the three types of worker.  
7. Tests of equality of the estimated coefficients of Employer Tenure and Employer Tenure squared across the PRP and fixed wage equations led to a test statistic of 6.25 suggesting that employer tenure 
terms are significantly different at the 1% level across two types of worker. 
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Table 5: British Household Panel: 1991-1999 
Dependent Variable: Log Hourly Earnings 
 Fixed Wage PRP Self Employed 
 Spec. A Spec. B Spec. C Spec. A Spec. B Spec. C Spec. A Spec. B Spec. C 
 Coeff T Stat Coeff T Stat Coeff T Stat Coeff T Stat Coeff T Stat Coeff T Stat Coeff T Stat Coeff T Stat Coeff T Stat 
Age 0.0895 35.29 - - - - 0.0821 21.99 - - - - 0.0607 2.26 - - - - 
Age-Squared -0.0010 -30.83 - - - - -0.0009 -18.90 - - - - -0.0007 -2.33 - - - - 
YILF1 - - 0.0578 37.00 - - - - 0.0542 23.72 - - - - 0.0336 1.96 - - 
YILF-Squared - - -0.0008 -30.27 - - - - -0.0008 -19.02 - - - - -0.0006 -2.11 - - 
Job Tenure - - -  0.0192 15.00 - - - - 0.0151 7.18 - - - - 0.0022 0.22 
Job Tenure Squared - - -  -0.0005 -9.73 - - - - -0.0003 -3.88 - - - - 0.0002 0.80 
Years of Education -0.0007 -0.44 0.0155 9.13 0.0016 0.93 0.0001 0.04 0.0147 6.17 0.0017 0.72 -0.0086 -0.58 -0.0064 -0.41 -0.0059 -0.40 
Selectivity Term -0.1025 -10.58 -0.1059 -10.92 -0.0676 -6.79 0.0457 2.85 0.0476 2.96 -0.0099 -0.59 0.0019 0.03 0.0046 0.06 0.0362 0.51 
Promotion 0.0284 2.61 0.0292 2.68 0.0661 5.68 0.4917 4.17 0.0500 4.24 0.0777 5.97 - - - - - - 
Annual Increment 0.0076 1.19 0.0078 1.22 0.0011 0.17 0.0191 2.24 0.0195 2.29 0.0030 0.34 - - - - - - 
Constant -0.2252 -4.19 0.6561 18.33 1.5417 53.44 -0.0901 -1.05 0.7021 11.69 1.6222 33.70 -0.1138 -0.18 0.6329 1.45 0.9139 3.08 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Highest Ed. Cert Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Turning Point (Yrs) 44.8 36.3 19.2 45.6 33.9 25.2 43.4 28.0 5.5 
R2 Within 0.0780 0.0749 0.0356 0.1153 0.1152 0.0570 0.0099 0.0097 0.0101 
R2 Between 0.4186 0.4196 0.3480 0.4284 0.4304 0.3618 0.0353 0.0345 0.0337 
R2 Overall 0.3926 0.3918 0.3269 0.4206 0.4195 0.3536 0.0381 0.0389 0.0383 
Wald Chi-Square 4145 30 4124 30 2507 30 2538 30 2553 30 1668 30 68.4528 67.49 28 67.82 28 
Nos. of Obs. 14284 14284 14284 6212 6212 6212 3716 3716 3716 
Nos. of Groups  4594 4594 4594 2806 2806 2806 1153 1153 1153 
Notes: 
1. YILF = Years in Labour Force 
2. Promotion is a zero-one dummy variable equalling one if the respondent had been promoted in the current year and zero otherwise; Annual Increment is zero-one dummy variable equalling one if there is an incremental pay scale at the 
respondent’s place of work and zero otherwise.  
3. Highest Education Certificates: Degree, Further Education, A Level, GCSE Grades A to C, GCSE Grades below C, Other Qualification; Occupation Dummies: Managerial, Professional, Intermediate Non-Manual, Sales, Clerical, 
Personal Services, Skilled Manual, Semi-Skilled Manual, Unskilled Manual; Industry Dummies: Energy, Extraction, Engineering, Manufacturing, Construction, Distribution, Transport, Storage and Communication, Finance, Other Non 
Manufacturing. 
4. Robust standard errors are reported. 
5. Tests of equality of the estimated coefficients of age and age squared across the PRP and fixed wage equations led to a test statistic of 18.37 and tests of equality of the estimated coefficients of the age and age squared terms across the 
self-employed wage equation and that for PRP employees led to a test statistic of 126.76 suggesting that the age terms are significantly different at the 1% level across the three types of worker.  
6. Tests of equality of the estimated coefficients of YILF and YILF squared across the PRP and fixed wage equations led to a test statistic of 1.82 and tests of equality of the estimated coefficients of the experience and experience squared 
terms across the self-employed wage equation and that for PRP employees led to a test statistic of 18.08 suggesting that the experience terms are significantly different at the 1% level across PRP and self-employed workers.  
7. Tests of equality of the estimated coefficients of job tenure and job tenure squared across the PRP and fixed wage equations led to a test statistic of 12.30 and tests of equality of the estimated coefficients of the age and age squared terms 
across the self-employed wage equation and that for PRP employees led to a test statistic of 40.98 suggesting that the job tenure terms are significantly different at the 1% level across the three types of worker. 
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Table 6: Family Expenditure Survey 1997/98, 1998/99 and 1999/00 
Dependent Variable: Log Hourly Earnings 
 Fixed Wage PRP Self Employed 
 Spec. A Spec. B Spec. A Spec. B Spec. A Spec. B 
 Coeff T Stat Coeff T Stat Coeff T Stat Coeff T Stat Coeff T Stat Coeff T Stat 
Age 0.0677 15.59 - - 0.0553 5.27 -0.0019 -0.06 - - 
Age-Squared -0.0007 -14.28 - - -0.0005 -3.77 -0.0001 -0.40 - - 
YILF1 - - 0.0422 15.44 - - 0.0380 7.21 - - -0.0240 -1.31 
YILF-Squared - - -0.0007 -14.36 - - -0.0005 -4.34 - - 0.0001 0.47 
Years of Education 0.0160 2.10 0.0311 4.33 0.0412 3.15 0.0610 4.66 -0.0162 -0.68 -0.0388 -1.53 
Selectivity Term 0.1679 2.99 0.1956 3.04 -0.4378 -4.15 -0.4896 -4.47 -0.4030 -1.57 -0.6098 -2.44  
Constant 0.7400 6.54 1.5724 17.09 1.3877 4.02 2.0280 8.20 3.4795 2.61 4.4272 4.30 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Highest Ed. Cert Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Turning Point (Years) 47.9 30.1 55.3 38.0 9.5 120.0 
R2 0.3306 0.3304 0.4356 0.4430 0.3306 0.1522 
F Statistic 141.13 (25, 5939) 143.52 (25, 5939) 33.48 (25, 1201) 35.88 (25, 1201) 141.13 (24, 1214) 10.26 (24, 1214) 
Nos of Obs. 5965 5965 1201 1201 1239 1239 
Notes:  
1. YILF = Years in Labour Force 
2. Highest Education Certificates: Degree, Further Education, A Level, GCSE Grades A-C, GCSE Grades below C, Other Qualification;  
3. Occupation Dummies: Professional, Other Non Manual, Skilled Manual, Semi-skilled, Unskilled Manual; Industry Dummies: Energy, Metal Extraction, Metal Goods, Other Manufacturing, 
Construction, Distribution, Transport and Communications, Banking, Other Services. 
4. Robust standard errors are reported. 
5. Tests of equality of the estimated coefficients of age and age squared across the PRP and fixed wage wage equations led to a test statistic of 56.02 and tests of equality of the estimated coefficients of 
the age and age squared terms across the self-employed wage equation and that for PRP employees led to a test statistic of 163.98 suggesting that the age terms are significantly different at the 1% level 
across the three types of worker.  
6. Tests of equality of the estimated coefficients of YILF and YILF squared across the PRP and fixed wage equations led to a test statistic of 68.71 and tests of equality of the estimated coefficients of the 
experience and experience squared terms across the self-employed wage equation and that for PRP employees led to a test statistic of 345.83 for the BSAS suggesting that the YILF terms are significantly 
different at the 1% level across the three types of worker. 
 
 
 
4 
 
Table 7: Lambda ( )λ - Summary Statistics 
 Family Expenditure Survey 
1997/98, 1998/99, 1999/00 
British Household Panel Survey 
1997-1999 
λ  All Workers PRP Workers All Workers PRP Workers 
Mean 0.152 0.054 0.234 0.302 
Standard Deviation 0.349 0.069 0.364 0.223 
Minimum 0.000 9.28E-06 0.000 0.001 
Maximum 1.000 0.476 1.000 0.981 
Observations 8405 1201 9187 2840 
Note: Lambda is defined as the ratio of bonus pay to total pay – see Equation (9).  
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Table 8: Continuous Sharing Coefficient: FES 1997/98, 1998/99, 1999/00 
Dependent Variable: Log Hourly Earnings 
 Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4 Spec. 5 Spec. 6 
 Coeff T Stat Coeff T Stat Coeff T Stat Coeff T Stat Coeff T Stat Coeff T Stat 
Age 0.0755 18.08 0.0753 19.06 0.0783 21.06 - - - - - - 
Age-Squared -0.0008 -15.75 -0.0008 -16.71 -0.0008 -18.45 - - - - - - 
YILF1 - - - - - - 0.0457 20.48 0.0488 22.77 0.0489 23.19 
YILF-Squared - - - - - - -0.0008 -17.03 -0.0008 -19.29 -0.0008 -19.57 
Lambda -0.5354 -16.81 - - 0.6085 1.37 -0.5566 -17.51 - - 0.0259 0.19 
Lambda* Age - - -0.0193 -5.69 -0.0478 -2.22 - - - - - - 
Lambda* Age-Squared - - 0.0002 2.21 0.0005 1.88 - - - - - - 
Lambda* YILF1 - - - - - -  - -0.0413 -9.91 -0.0432 -3.72 
Lambda* YILF-Squared - - - - - -  - 0.0007 5.59 0.0007 3.15 
Years of Education 0.0109 1.56 0.0112 1.60 0.0111 1.58 0.0257 3.78 0.0256 3.76 0.0256 3.76 
Constant 0.8587 7.21 0.8444 7.23 0.7882 6.94 1.8260 19.36 1.7869 19.04 1.785 19.03 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Highest Ed. Cert Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.3071 0.3088 0.3088 0.3077 0.3113 0.3113 
F Statistic 154.92 (25, 8379) 152.53 (26, 8378) 152.53 (26, 8378) 156.21 (25, 8379) 156.61(26, 8378) 155.47 (27, 8377) 
Nos of Obs. 8405 8405 8405 8405 8405 8405 
Notes:  
1. Highest Education Certificates: Degree, Further Education/A Level, GCSE, below GCSE; Occupation Dummies: Managerial, Professional, Skilled Manual, Semi-Skilled Manual, Unskilled Manual; 
Industry Dummies: Mining and Quarrying, Manufacturing, Electricity, Gas and Water Supply, Construction, Wholesale and Retail Trade, Hotels and Restaurants, Transport, Storage and 
Communication, Financial Intermediation, Real Estate, Public Administration, Education, Health, Community Social and Personal Services. 
2. Standard Errors adjusted according to the White-Huber approach due to the presence of heteroskedasticity. 
3. Lambda = PRP/Total Pay. 
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Table 9: Continuous Sharing Coefficient: BHPS 1997-1999 
Dependent Variable: Log Hourly Earnings 
 Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4 Spec. 5 Spec. 6 Spec. 7 Spec. 8 Spec. 9 
 Coeff T Stat Coeff T Stat Coeff T Stat Coeff T Stat Coeff T Stat Coeff T Stat Coeff T Stat Coeff T Stat Coeff T Stat 
Age 0.0872 10.81 0.0791 9.58 0.0774 8.56 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Age-Squared -0.0010 -10.04 -0.0009 -8.17 -0.0008 -7.34 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
YILF1 - - - - - - 0.0510 10.55 0.0483 9.63 0.0525 9.74 - - - - - - 
YILF-Squared - - - - - - -0.0008 -9.39 -0.0007 -7.51 -0.0008 -7.79 - - - - - - 
Job Tenure - - - - - -       0.0201 4.90 0.0286 5.85 0.0242 4.75 
Job Tenure Squared - - - - - -       -0.0005 -3.35 -0.0006 -3.33 -0.0005 -2.64 
Lambda -0.2620 -7.51 - - -0.1945 -0.46 -0.2637 -7.55 - - 0.3631 2.13 -0.2412 -6.87 - - -0.1600 -3.41 
Lambda* Age - - 0.0063 1.74 0.0159 0.75             
Lambda* Age-Squared - - -0.0003 -3.83 -0.0004 -1.59             
Lambda* YILF1 - - - - - - - - -0.0023 -0.56 -0.0280 -2.20       
Lambda* YILF-Squared - - - - - - - - -0.0002 -2.28 0.0002 0.73       
Lambda* Job. Tenure - - - - - -       - - -0.0376 -4.85 -0.0177 -1.82 
Lambda* Job. Tenure2 - - - - - -       - - 0.0007 2.41 0.0002 0.69 
Years of Education -0.0071 -1.74 -0.0069 -1.69 -0.0069 -1.69 0.0021 0.48 0.0023 0.54 0.0025 0.58 -0.0050 -1.20 -0.0051 -1.22 -0.0050 -1.21 
Constant -0.1690 -1.01 -0.1071 -0.63 -0.0748 -0.41 0.8103 7.82 0.7823 7.56 0.7265 6.81 1.4589 18.66 1.4065 18.04 1.4409 18.36 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Highest Ed. Cert Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2-Within 0.0020 0.0034 0.0034 0.0021 0.0037 0.0040 0.0025 0.0019 0.0019 
R2-Between 0.1647 0.1677 0.1676 0.1620 0.1657 0.1659 0.1485 0.1475 0.1520 
R2-Overall 0.1473 0.1498 0.1496 0.1453 0.1486 0.1492 0.1315 0.1313 0.1336 
Wald Chi-Squared 80826 84827 84728 79226 83927 84328 68926 68327 69828 
Nos. of Observations 9187 9187 9187 9187 9187 9187 9187 9187 9187 
Nos. of Groups 4464 4464 4464 4464 4464 4464 4464 4464 4464 
Notes: 
1. Highest Education Certificates: Degree, Further Education/A Level, GCSE, below GCSE; Occupation Dummies: Managerial, Professional, Skilled Manual, Semi-Skilled Manual, Unskilled Manual; Industry 
Dummies: Mining and Quarrying, Manufacturing, Electricity, Gas and Water Supply, Construction, Wholesale and Retail Trade, Hotels and Restaurants, Transport, Storage and Communication, Financial 
Intermediation, Real Estate, Public Administration, Education, Health, Community Social and Personal Services. 
2. Standard Errors adjusted according to the White-Huber approach due to the presence of heteroskedasticity. 
3. Lambda = PRP/Total Pay 
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Table 10: Training Frequencies 
 PRP Employees Salaried Employees All Employees 
 Obs. Mean S. Dev Obs Mean S. Dev Obs Mean S Dev 
          
BSAS 1987          
Train          
Exp. < 5 Yrs 28 0.9286 0.2623 50 0.9000 0.3030 78 0.9103 0.2877 
5 < Exp.< 10 Yrs 31 0.7742 0.4250 52 0.7885 0.4124 83 0.7831 0.4146 
10 < Exp. < 20 Yrs 61 0.7541 0.4342 101 0.6931 0.4635 162 0.7160 0.4523 
Exp. > 20 Yrs 153 0.5882 0.4938 203 0.6847 0.4658 356 0.6433 0.4797 
All Employees  273 0.6813 0.4668 406 0.7266 0.4463 679 0.7084 0.4548 
Trains          
Exp. < 5 Yrs 28 3.8929 2.0788 50 3.7000 2.0923 78 3.7692 2.0758 
5 < Exp.< 10 Yrs 31 2.6129 2.0278 52 2.6923 2.2798 83 2.6627 2.1768 
10 < Exp. < 20 Yrs 61 2.4590 2.1952 101 2.4158 2.2058 162 2.4321 2.1951 
Exp. > 20 Yrs 153 1.7190 1.9717 203 1.9803 1.9447 356 1.8680 1.9579 
All Employees 273 2.2088 2.1395 406 2.3916 2.1400 679 2.3181 2.1401 
          
BHPS 1991-1999          
Train 6212 0.1718 0.3772 14284 0.1246 0.3303 20496 0.1389 0.3458 
Exp. < 5 Yrs 68 0.3088 0.4654 198 0.2475 0.4326 266 0.2632 0.4412 
5 < Exp.< 10 Yrs 765 0.2065 0.4051 1792 0.1735 0.3788 2557 0.1834 0.3871 
10 < Exp. < 20 Yrs 2015 0.1856 0.3889 4000 0.1465 0.3537 6015 0.1596 0.3663 
Exp. > 20 Yrs 3364 0.1528 0.3598 8294 0.1006 0.3008 11658 0.1156 0.3198 
   All Employees 6212 0.1718 0.3772 14284 0.1246 0.3303 20496 0.1389 0.3458 
          
          
Notes:  
1. The BSAS survey for 1987 asked respondents, in the two years preceding the survey interview, whether they had been: (i) asked to do anything just for practice in order to learn the 
work; (ii) given any special talks or lectures about the work; (iii) placed with more experienced people to see how the work should be done; (iv) sent around to different parts of the 
organisation to see how the work is done; (v) asked to read things to help learn about the work; (vi) taught or trained by anyone whilst actually doing the work; (vii) sent on any 
courses to introduce new methods of working. ‘Train’ equals one if the respondent answered ‘yes’ to any of these questions, and zero otherwise. ‘Trains’ is an index that equals the 
number of these questions to which the respondent had answered ‘yes’. 
2. Participants in the BHPS were asked whether in the preceding year they had participated in any off-the-job education or training. For these respondents the variable ‘Train’ is a 
zero-one dummy variable recording their response. 
8 
 
Table 11: PRP and Training Incidence (Summary of Results) 
 BSAS 1987 BHPS 1991-99 
 Probit (1) Ordered Probit (1) Probit (2) Ordered Probit (2) Probit (1) Probit (2) 
 Dep Var = Train Dep Var = Trains Dep Var = Train Dep Var = Trains Dep Var = Train Dep Var = Train 
 Coeff T Stat Coeff T Stat Coeff T Stat Coeff T Stat Coeff T Stat Coeff T Stat 
Experience -0.0335 -5.95 -0.0324 -7.47 -0.0311 -4.72 -0.0292 -5.81 -0.183 10.49 -0.020 10.15 
PRP Dummy -0.0700 -0.59 -0.0071 -0.08 0.2736 0.64 0.6316 2.04 0.106 3.30 0.015 0.12 
(Exp < 5)*PRP - - - - 0.0130 0.10 -0.0878 -0.99 - - 0.099 2.27 
(5 < Exp < 10)*PRP - - - - -0.0525 -0.87 -0.0899 -2.07 - - -0.002 0.14 
(10 < Exp < 20)*PRP - - - - -0.0211 -0.76 -0.0440 -2.15 - - 0.003 0.40 
(Exp > 20)*PRP - - - - -0.0116 -0.88 -0.0211 -2.12 - - 0.005 1.15 
Log Likelihood  -339.3235 -1219.0619 -338.37818 -1215.8068 -6738.750 -6733.579 
Nos of Observations 679 679 679 679 20496 20496 
Notes: 
1. See Note 1 to Table 10 for definitions of ‘Train’ and ‘Trains’. 
2. Controls were also included for occupation, region, industry, education, firm size, marital status and ethnicity. 
 
